KHARTOUM, Sudan — The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-led government is continuing talks with Russia regarding a naval base on the Red Sea, a strategic move that would grant Russia its first military foothold in the crucial maritime corridor. The discussions are seen as an attempt by the SAF to extract vital military support from Moscow and leverage concessions from the United States amidst escalating fighting in Sudan’s nearly two-year civil war.
Sudanese military officials presented a formal plan to Russian counterparts in October. Under the proposal, Russia would gain port and mining rights in exchange for supplying the SAF with antiaircraft systems and additional weaponry, potentially including fighter jets.
The deal, which has been under discussion since 2017, would reportedly grant Russia a 25-year lease and the ability to station up to 300 troops and four warships, including nuclear-powered vessels. While a preliminary agreement was signed in 2019, its implementation has been stalled by political instability. SAF officials now claim a non-existent legislature must ratify the deal.
Seeking Arms and Leverage
The SAF’s renewed interest in the base deal comes as it struggles to counter drone attacks from its rival, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Russian weapons are highly appealing given the SAF’s difficulty in achieving air superiority and its need for more support since the fall of el Fasher in October.
The SAF is likely using the prospect of a Russian base to simultaneously pressure the United States to take a more favorable stance in regional peace negotiations.
SAF head and government leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan publicly criticized the U.S. Senior Adviser for Africa, Massad Boulos, on November 23, accusing him of favoring the RSF and its primary backer, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in the so-called “Quad” peace efforts (comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the U.S.).
Burhan alleged that the Quad recently proposed a peace agreement that would allow the RSF to remain operational while requiring the SAF to demobilize. Burhan has consistently demanded that the RSF withdraw from population centers and demobilize before any peace talks can begin.
RSF Captures Key Garrison
The base talks occur against a backdrop of major military gains by the RSF.
On December 1, the RSF captured the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division Headquarters in Babanusa after a nearly two-year siege and intensified air and ground attacks. The fall of Babanusa means the RSF now controls almost the entirety of the West Kordofan region, further consolidating a de facto partition of Sudan. The RSF captured the town just weeks after taking el Fasher.
This consolidation directly contradicts the SAF’s demands for the RSF to withdraw from populated areas.
The escalating fighting has persisted despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated focus on ending the war. Both the RSF and SAF have received increased backing from external sponsors, notably the UAE for the RSF and Egypt for the SAF—both of which are members of the Quad peace body.
Shifting Focus to El Obeid
With the capture of Babanusa, both sides are expected to concentrate their resources on the main front lines around el Obeid, the SAF’s central headquarters.
The RSF can now redeploy forces from Babanusa to pressure the SAF-controlled Dilling-Kadugli pocket to the south of el Obeid, utilizing a 200-mile stretch of RSF-controlled highway. Fighting has already intensified on this axis, with the SAF conducting drone strikes on allied SPLM-N al Hilu militia camps in an apparent attempt to preempt a major RSF offensive on el Obeid.
The SAF is also attempting to strengthen supply lines on the northern axis between el Obeid and Khartoum, a contested corridor where the RSF recently captured the key town of Bara.
